New threats to forces in J&K

In any irregular warfare situation, when terrorists are on the run due to security forces’ pressure, they will resort to unconventional ways of diluting the forces’ effectiveness. In 1999, at the height of Kargil operations, terror groups chose to execute ‘Fidayeen’ attacks or suicide missions. These forced out of proportion defensive security measures to be taken by the armed forces, thus reducing the ongoing pressure from offensive counter-terror operations. The advent of stone throwing and street turbulence in 2008 was a ploy employed when terrorist numbers plummeted after the LoC fence came into being in 2004 and enabled far more effective counter infiltration.

This created another domain sometimes referred as “agitational terrorism”. The army had raised the Rashtriya Rifles (RR) to fight terrorism and it proved to be one of the most successful military experiments. Remaining one of the most effective arms of the security forces has been the Jammu and Kashmir Police. Its continuity in operations, wealth of experience of its personnel, affinity with the local populace and steadfastness under threat, from time to time, has all through ensured a force multiplication effect. Alongside them are the personnel of the JAK Light Infantry’s Territorial Army Home & Hearth units, as also regular soldiers from the JAK LI Regiment whose presence while on leave (2,000-3,000 personnel at any given time) in villages and cities has had a stabilising effect on the environment. Through the height of the militancy, these personnel were never targeted by terrorists, presumably on the premise that it would attract the ire of the army and the JKP. The foreign terrorists (FTs), then in majority, always suspected that much more intense operations would follow if local SF personnel and their families became targets.

The steadfastness of the local soldiers and policemen under trying circumstances within Kashmir’s social milieu was one of the hallmarks of our efforts towards countering Pakistani and separatist efforts. It was particularly borne out during the 2008-10 agitation. In 2016, in the wake of Burhan Wani’s killing, it was the local militancy which took the upper hand. The first noticeable change was the initiation of the targeting of policemen’s homes and forced admission by their families of allegiance to the terrorist cause. From then on, as the local hold over the violent element of the separatist movement was enhanced, the threat to local soldiers on leave and policemen has multiplied manifold. The paralysis and embarrassment of the administration through targeting of local functionaries was earlier witnessed with the killing of 16 sarpanchs and injuring of 30 other elected grassroots leaders over the last few years.

In the interim, in August 2018, the establishment reportedly attempted an intimidation and targeting of the families of a few terrorists leading to a quid pro quo action by terrorists against policemen’s families. The standoff eased once both sides stood down but it probably emboldened the local terrorists to renew their threats and execute these with a higher level of intimidation. That translated on September 18 2018, when Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) issued a warning through an uploaded video recording. It threatened to kill every Kashmiri working for JKP and Indian Army if they didn’t resign within four days; failure to resign would lead to the killing of families, as per the threat. The video went viral on social media bringing yet another facet into the ongoing information war which the terrorists are clearly dominating thus far.

Not taking the threat too lightly, the authorities have displayed sensitivity to the sentiments that will be created within ranks of soldiers serving away from the Valley, the TA-H&H and personnel of the JKP who remain the most visible and vulnerable. The Hizbul Mujahideen has given an indication of its intent to do on ground what it has threatened, when it killed three SPOs in Shopian on 21 September 2018. It is obvious that securing all Kashmiri armed forces personnel and families will pose a bigger challenge for the establishment and take away much of the offensive content from the anti-terrorism operations.

A major domain which will be affected will be intelligence, for which the army’s dependence is largely on the JKP. In the see-saw battle for domination of the security space in the Valley, the SF have been clearly dominant once the negative situation arising from the trigger effect of the killing of Burhan Wani on 8 July 2016 was stabilised. That domination is now under challenge and answers are not easy. This will have an adverse effect also on the intended strategy of the government to take the proxy war campaign beyond just security related operations. Outreach operations, restoration of political activity at the grassroots and most importantly the successful conduct of the local bodies’ polls due over the next two months, will all be adversely affected.

The government needs to act quickly to restore confidence. It is not panic station yet, but clearly there is a dearth of troops in Shopian, in particular, that is affording space and freedom of movement to the terrorists. The only answer is through a strong focused response against the terrorists and their leadership by greater density of troops presence. Once earlier, in 2010, the separatists attempted to cross the limit of tolerance of the establishment by threatening to surround all army camps in the Valley. It was an ill-advised move, against which the army made its intent extremely clear; that it would brook no attempts at intimidation and would unhesitatingly resort to counter violence to defeat such attempts. The separatists then stood down.

However, times have changed. The separatists and terrorists, backed by the deep State across the LoC, have been emboldened many a time in recent years to cross the limits of tolerance and bear consequences in the vain hope that it would create far greater alienation and force the hand of the establishment. If they are targeting the local bodies’ polls for cancellation, then the government needs to be even more committed towards their conduct once the announcement has been made.

This is not a juncture when the establishment can display any squeamishness or be forced on the back foot. It is only hoped that better sense will prevail in the thinking of HM who may find that in the battle of wits, the government can accept being on the back foot only temporarily. In the long run, it can remain defensive only at a very negative cost.

The author commanded the 15 Corps in J&K and is now the Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir. Views expressed are personal.