The Middle Eastern Conundrum

A recent Al-Hayat Op-ed by Yezid Sayigh, reprinted by the Carnegie Middle East Centre as Redrawing the Lines in Syria’s Shatterbelt, and focused on the possible changes in the Syrian map as the ruling regime in Syria, the armed opposition and the Islamic State fight for control in what is termed as the ‘‘shatterbelt”(the Syrian regime held areas of Daraa city and other parts of Syria’s south, Aleppo and its nearby countryside and the region east of the Damascus-Homs highway) prompts visions about similar settings in medieval times. It argues that it is Aleppo that poses the biggest dilemma, though Syrian regime forces could hold on to it for some time. The reasons cited for this belief is intriguing and reminiscent of a time when forts and castles had to be defended for prolonged periods against invasion. This is what it says about Aleppo:

“Although parts of the city face a severe shortage of water, it generally has some ability to withstand a cut-off of its main supply by using boreholes; even regime held neighbourhoods receive one or two hours of electricity a day, so further cuts would add to the population’s misery but not prove decisive. And despite the likelihood that international relief convoys will no longer be able to reach Aleppo from Damascus, the city gets its food supply locally.”

In the midst of discussions about a vulnerable regime’s definition of its core areas or “useful Syria”, reports of unprecedented violence and growing numbers of refugees who are caught in the crossfire between the Islamic State, the Syrian Kurdish army and states reluctant to host them, such reports create disbelief about the century we live in. This is compounded by the insecurity of neighbouring states like Turkey where the media is now abuzz with the news that the Turkish military has been asked to create a neutral zone along the 100 km border with Syria which would not only contain the Islamic State but also prevent the creation of a Kurdish state along Turkey’s south eastern border and keep the Syrian refugees within the borders of Syria. Syrian Kurdish fighters are now in the offensive in northern Syria and control a long stretch along the Turkish-Syrian border. Turkey which has battled domestic Kurdish insurgency for decades and has only recently begun negotiations for conciliation, fears the domestic consequences of the creation of a contiguous area under Kurdish control. In a sense of course it was Turkey’s anti-Assad policies and support for anti-Assad groups that generated the pro-Kurdish outcome. 

This is compounded by the results of the recent election in Turkey. After 13 years of domination as a single party government, the AKP (Justice and Development Party) which has been facing the brunt of criticism for its increasingly authoritarian style of governance, flagging economy and inability to negotiate a solution to the Kurdish problem, failed to secure the 276 seats required to form a single party government. The induction of the HDP in the Parliament could well mean reconsideration of Turkish support for the Kurdish agenda in the neighbourhood as the HDP represents a transnational movement though the AKP has ruled out the possibility of any coalition with them. The Kurdish agenda itself is also no longer confined to south eastern Anatolia. It is expanding to include parts of northern Syria as also western Turkish cities like Istanbul and Izmir. There is therefore criticism of the caretaker government’s move to mobilise the army at a time when domestic politics in Turkey itself is in flux.

When the Syrian conflict began with pro-democracy protests against President Bashar al Assad, there was a general belief, shared by Turkey, that the fall of the regime was imminent. Four years down the line, with hundreds of thousands dead and 11 million refugees this has been proved to be incorrect. The conflict has also acquired sectarian overtones. To this conundrum is now added the possibility of a 5,000-strong US-trained force of ‘‘moderate rebels” to fight the Islamic State on the ground, the fact that Iran and Russia have helped and called for support for the al Assad regime while Turkey and Saudi Arabia have called for the making of a Sunni army.

These lines are unlikely to be blurred by the recent nuclear deal signed between Iran and six major world powers. One of the first signs of this is the fact that the Syrian President referred to the deal as a major turning point in the history of the region and sought greater support from Iran in the regime’s conflict with the opposition. The conflict, as also the fact the two countries face a common adversary in the Islamic State, on the other hand has been one of the reasons for the United States to improve its relations with Iran. The prospect of a deal has in the meantime helped push down global oil prices with the possibility that the Iranian supply could return to the market.

While India has steered clear of involvement in the conflict between the government of al Assad and the opposition, a more assertive foreign policy stance has encouraged Syria to request India to play the role of a mediator.

However, this would involve more than just good relations with both Syria and the US and one where energy security comes into play. India imports nearly 70 percent of its oil, and that figure is projected to rise as high as 90 percent in the years to come. The reduction of petroleum prices at this stage will help macroeconomic stability. However, the deal has generated concern among Gulf States and Saudi Arabia on whom India’s economic engagement in the Middle East has traditionally depended. While the end of Tehran’s isolation will support Iran’s role as India’s gateway to Central Asia and Afghanistan and also possibly work against the expansion of extremism in the Greater Middle East and India’s neighbourhood, a network of allegiances and interests will come into play in the final determination of the way India engages with the region. In the midst of this however, a human tragedy of unprecedented proportions continues where personal religious beliefs and ethnic affiliations have once again assumed significance. Ignoring this conundrum could well prove costly.

The author is Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata