What really happened at Azad Maidan on August 11?

The police’s handling of the disturbance engineered by a small group of Muslim zealots on August 11 outside Azad Maidan calls for a case study.

Students of police science will benefit greatly from this since there are many lessons to be learnt. It is fortunate that the end result was positive as the ‘inaction’ of the police shifted the balance of sympathy in their favour, putting the entire Muslim community on the defensive.

Any other ending might have led to a major communal conflagration.  If that had happened, the miscreants would have achieved what I suspect they set out to do, probably at the behest of foreign or anti-national elements who want life to be disrupted in the financial capital of India.

But even if the end result turned out to the advantage of the general populace and ensured another period of peace, it is important to address some fundamental questions on the actions/inaction of the police while dealing with the rioters.  Some questions are:

1) Did the police leadership know about the SMSes and morphed videos that were being circulated in order to incite passions?  If the answer is ‘yes’, why were steps not taken to trace the culprits at that stage itself?

2) If the leadership did get this information, which it probably did, what plan of action was drawn up to meet likely trouble on the streets?

3) Did the commissioner confabulate with his DCPs and inspectors in charge of police stations who would be called upon to meet the situation?  Were they on the same wavelength as the leadership when they stepped out to meet the challenge?

4) How were weapons snatched from policemen? Were the armed men not kept together in a squad as required by riot drill manuals? Were the lathi men not kept in front, the teargas squad behind them and armed men in formation at the rear to be summoned as a last resort? It appears that some armed policemen were wandering about on their own which is against all norms as it would make them vulnerable to attack and dispossession of their arms. Or were the arms kept carelessly unattended in vehicles by some irresponsible policemen?  In the present climate of politicisation, supervision of such men has become a casualty.

5) Why were lathis not used when a small group of miscreants started to create trouble by burning vehicles?  Why was tear gas not used to disperse the crowd at that time?  The police have been trained to first use lathis then tear gas and lastly their weapons. This drill was not followed, perhaps for valid reasons.

6)  Why did the police commissioner order a DCP to release a man whom the latter had arrested? He must have some explanation for this action that has not been proffered causing the spread of misinformation and misinterpretation of his action

7)  Why were women police deployed?  Who was in charge of their unit when they were allegedly molested?  Were they not backed up by their male counterparts?  Incidentally, the method of their recruitment and training, both physical and mental, needs a review.

It is usual for armchair analysts to talk glibly about what should have been done. It is not easy to handle mobs because in a mob, individual personalities are obliterated and a collective personality that doesn’t think rationally takes over. It is imperative for the police to splinter this collective personality and make members of the mob think rationally as individuals. This often requires a certain amount of force whose extent must be judged in a split second by the officer on the spot.

The police succeeded in saving the people of Mumbai from a huge communal flare-up that could have lasted for days.  We should thank our stars for this, but must not hesitate to ask questions about their professionalism and the quality of leadership.

There has been rapid politicisation of the force in recent times.  It has been fuelled by the misuse of the power of appointment and transfers by politicians who do not weigh consequences. By ignoring departmental hierarchy they are ensuring that the force becomes more corrupt and more indisciplined, leading to its inability to rise to the occasion in times of trouble.  The recent move by the state’s home minister to abrogate powers of transferring even subordinate police officers like sub-inspectors and inspectors will affect professional performance and spell disaster for the people of Maharashtra.

The author is a former commissioner, Mumbai police