Belling the nuclear cat

C Uday Bhaskar

The Iranian nuclear nettle and the vote at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna (likely to be held on February 2) are back in the news thanks to the observations made by US ambassador Mulford. The latter in the course of a media interview (January 25) had noted that the Indian vote on Iran would have a bearing on how the US Congress perceived the India-US agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation. Mulford was quoted as cautioning that if India did not vote against Iran, the fallout in the US Congress would be ‘devastating’ and that the July 2005 India-US initiative would ‘die’.

Predictably, this public articulation—while being factually true and no different from what Senator John Kerry had stated in Delhi (January 12)—generated considerable ire, which led to the Ambassador being chided by both Delhi and Washington for his indiscretion. Yet, the Iranian nuclear issue and recent statements from Teheran have caused concern in the global community and the permanent five (P 5) of the UN Security Council met in London on January 30 to finalise their stance. At the core is whether Iran is to be referred to the UNSC by the IAEA for purported transgressions.

In September last, the 35 member IAEA board took up the Iranian nuclear issue and passed a resolution that inter alia found: “That Iran’s many failures and breaches of its obligations to comply with its NPT Safeguards Agreement…” Furthermore, the board in its resolution also found that: “The history of concealment of Iran’s nuclear activities referred to in the director general’s report, the nature of these activities, issues brought to light in the course of the Agency’s verification of declarations made by Iran since September 2002 and the resulting absence of confidence that Iran’s nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes have given rise to questions…within the competence of the Security Council…”

Of the then 35 members, the following abstained: Algeria, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Vietnam, and Yemen. Only one country voted against the resolution—namely Venezuela— which had asked for the vote in the first place. The composition of the board has since changed though India is still a member.

Iran is accused of pursuing a clandestine nuclear programme for almost 18 years and this involves the AQ Khan network and a Pakistan-North Korea-Sudan linkage. Some details of this network have come to light in recent years and India’s concerns about the need to have this issue examined more rigorously is shared by many countries.
Teheran however maintains that it is not in violation of any of the obligations that devolve upon it as a non nuclear weapon state of the NPT and that it is entitled to certain technical activities as part of its civilian nuclear programme.

While Iran may not be in violation in purely techno-legal terms, the intent behind the 18 year concealment is at the heart of the current impasse. India voted with the majority on determining that more time was needed at the IAEA level and that a reference to the UNSC would only escalate turbulence.

The USA and the EU states claim that Iran is secretly trying to acquire WMD and that the matter must be referred to the UNSC. However Russia and China are reluctant to endorse this stand and had abstained in September 2005. Currently Moscow has mooted a proposal wherein Iran’s right to enrichment would be respected but the actual process would be done under Russian aegis so there would be no anxiety about enriched material being diverted for weapon use.

But these initiatives are still being tossed around and in the interim, the head of the IAEA El Baradei stated in an interview (Newsweek, January 23): “For the last three years we have been doing intensive verification in Iran, and even after three years I am not yet in a postion to make a judgment on the peaceful nature of the [nuclear] programme.” Clearly the Iranian issue remains muddy and the nature of the resolution that is likely to come up on Feb 2 is still being debated among the P 5.

While India may be justified in taking umbrage at any arm twisting by the USA, the basis for the vote on Feb 2 should be based on strategic determinants and not on the basis of non-aligned solidarity or anti-US sentiment. Increasing the brittlemness over Iran will be counter-productive for the whole world and perhaps joining hands with Moscow and the EU to engage with Teheran to find a modus-vivendi may be the more prudent option. And getting to the bottom of the AQ Khan network is the more abiding concern for India. To that extent the wording of the IAEA resolution is crucial and emotive posturing is uncalled for.

The author is a deputy director of IDSA.