Change in Sri Lanka: Old issues remain for new regime

The outcome of the presidential elections in Sri Lanka is unlikely to lead to early resolution of the issues which dogged the regime of Mahinda Rajapaksa. In fact, President Maithripala Sirisena may be hard put to ensure certainty of policies to the satisfaction of the constituents who ensured his victory.
 
That is because while the regime has changed, the expectations relating to economic revival, ethnic reconciliation and ties with China, India and the US have not changed. For India, Rajapaksa was a “known devil” in whom Modi sarkar had invested heavily, although it did not want to be seen as backing either of the leading contenders in the election. With Sirisena at the helm, New Delhi would have to rework its calculations for an achievable equation in keeping with its strategic and security objectives while, at the same time, striving to safeguard the interests, rights and aspirations of the Tamil minority.
 
India has little in common with either China or the US when it comes to strengthening the basis for better bilateral relations with Sri Lanka. Yet, the US and China appear to loom large on Sirisena’s agenda because of domestic compulsions, the need for acceptability by the “international community” and regional politics.
 
The West, led by the US, was consistently hostile to Rajapaksa; more so after Sri Lanka intensified economic cooperation with China.  Rajapaksa’s independent foreign policy and defence of national sovereignty — evident in his refusal to be dictated to by the US, the UN and its agencies, and powerful lobbies of the Tamil diaspora – made him unpopular in the West, including among western media, intellectuals, NGOs and opinion-makers. The fact that he was unfazed and unhindered by such hostility – and able to carry on with the support of China in global forums — only strengthened the resolve of these powerful interests to hasten his political exit.
 
Therefore, it is not surprising that President Sirisena and the powerful figures backing him are pro-US. This means, the West may shed its hostility to Sri Lanka — but in return for results such as Colombo diluting its relations with Beijing and providing more infrastructure and investment opportunities to the West instead of China. Sri Lanka needs the West’s support and investible surplus to revive industrial development, reduce unemployment and generate new economic impulses. And, should Colombo open up in this regard, the West may go slow on the human rights issue and not demand immediate action in the matter of pursuing the alleged war crimes.
 
Yet, for all the promise of goodies from the West, the new regime may not find it easy to renege on commitments made to China, because halting projects mid-way could be disastrous for bilateral relations as well as the economy. Moreover, Sri Lanka is important to China’s Maritime Silk Road project. China’s desire to be visible in the Indian Ocean means its navy will not forego the access it currently enjoys to Sri Lankan ports.
 
While India is uneasy over increasing Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean and in Sri Lanka, New Delhi is equally opposed to Colombo being turned into an outpost for the West, even if it be to counter China. Neither Washington nor Beijing acknowledge India’s legitimate interests in Sri Lanka and the Indian Ocean.

Given this big power game in which Sirisena has to secure Sri Lanka’s place, India and its interests may not be priorities. Issues such as the army’s excesses including war crimes, the Tamil demand for justice, withdrawing of security forces from Tamil areas and devolution of powers to the Northeast Province would recede to the backburner.

The author is an independent political and foreign affairs commentator