Demilitarisation of Siachen

The slow death in hospital of ‘thambi’ Hanumanthappa of 19 Madras, dramatically retrieved from the debris of an icefall at Sonam post on Siachen, captured the imagination of India, inadvertently reverting the spotlight on the world’s highest and most treacherous battlefield. Nearly 30 years ago, three years after Indian troops first occupied Saltoro Ridge, the Pakistani post Qaid was captured by soldiers of 8 Jammu and Kashmir Light Infantry (JAK LI) led by Bana Singh who won the Param Vir Chakra (PVC). The rising star of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Benazir Bhutto confronted the military ruler, Gen Zia ul Haq with the taunt: ‘the Army should wear bangles’.

Pakistan’s Special Forces made many attempts to retake Qaid — renamed Bana — and once in 1988 almost re-took it but for the valour of 4 Gorkha Rifles. Bana Post is the most decorated speck of real estate in Indian military history worth one PVC, one Maha Vir Chakra (MVC), three Vir Chakras (VrCs) and several other gallantry awards. Reaching its crest undetected is the ultimate battle-winning feat.

Pakistan Army is pledged to settle scores with the Indian Army over its defeat in East Pakistan and the loss of Siachen including Qaid Post which allowed its artillery to bring down observed fire on Indian posts on Siachen glacier. The Qaid thorn was removed. Barring two fake encounters and routine exchange of fire, the hot war ended with the Cease Fire Agreement of 2003. Not a shot has been fired since. The Indian toll of casualties averages 10 annually, though this year already 14 lives have been lost in two avalanches. Harsh cold weather and vagaries of high altitude result in other casualties. Both sides have suffered — about 2000 soldiers killed and thousands maimed, mostly due to weather hazards. The obliteration of Sonam post is presumably due to global warming and climate change causing shifting and shrinking of glaciers. In 2012, the Pakistani base at Gayari with 130 personnel was snuffed out by an avalanche. Pakistan Army Chief Gen Ashraf Kayani’s offer of a mutual withdrawal was rejected. Then opposition leader, Nawaz Sharif suggested a unilateral withdrawal by Pakistan.

Maintenance and survival on Siachen glacier and Saltoro Ridge are much more difficult than on Pakistan’s Konduz glacier. To reach Bana top for example ladders and fixed ropes are required. When I first went to Siachen in 1988 only rudimentary facilities were available and survival was tough. Though the snow scooters had just been introduced at the Base Camp, personnel clothing was scrappy. With time and experience, conditions are  settled and stable with a kerosene pipeline laid to the Base Camp. In his term, Defence Minister George Fernandes despatched lazy Ministry of Defence (MoD) officials to Siachen in order to fast track procurement of high altitude equipment. Every Christmas he would visit Siachen to distribute sweets and cake.

Because of the extraordinarily acute environmental conditions in Siachen, no soldier spends more than 90 days on Saltoro ridge and altogether not more than six months, inclusive of rotation of troops. An Infantry battalion part of the Siachen brigade will aggregate one year undergoing acclimatisation, training at Siachen Battle School and induction and de-induction schedules. The Siachen Incentive Allowance started with Rs200 for officers and Rs30 for others. The 7th Pay Commission has recommended an increase from Rs14,000 to Rs21,000 for soldiers and for officers, from Rs21,000 to Rs35,000. What is mind-boggling though, is the profligacy of the civilian bureaucrats enhancing their own hardship allowance for places like Shillong and Guwahati to Rs55,000-70,000.

For the Indian Army though, hardship is a challenge. I recall meeting in 1990 a subaltern from the Gunners located at Bana as an Observation Post (OP) officer. He told me he volunteered for the job to prove his manhood and virility. Meeting a young Cavalry officer from the Pakistan Army at Peshawar around the same time, elicited a similar response. He had opted for Siachen to impress his girlfriend, so daunting was the assignment.

By locating new geopolitical ghosts, the strategic importance of Siachen has been inflated. Still, whether to accept a mutual withdrawal is the question. Operation Meghdoot was launched in 1984 to merely pre-empt Pakistan from occupying the Saltoro heights. In 2004, its mastermind, late Lt Gen ML Chhibber observed: “Siachen has scant significance; what is being talked about is invention.” India’s most highly decorated officer and hero of Hajipir, Lt Gen ZC Bakshi told me: “We should withdraw from Siachen provided the Pakistan Army places a Brigade on top.” With improved living conditions, the current generation of officers takes a hawkish position justifying the human and material costs (Rs3000 crore annually) for retention of Siachen’s dominating heights in order to prevent a linkup between all-weather allies, China in Aksai Chin and Pakistan in occupied Kashmir, maintaining dominance over Chinese-held Shaksgam valley and Gilgit-Baltistan across which the US$46 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor is to be constructed. For a country that dared not to cross LoC during Kargil, most of this is fantasy as instead of military operations, mountaineering expeditions would be required. It is said that the Indian Army enjoys a veto over the government’s Siachen policy. Not true. At Tashkent in 1965, the government returned Hajipir Pass and twice-captured Point 13620 in Kargil against military advice. Yes, withdrawal is a political decision.

Indian Army’s bottom line on demilitarisation is demarcation and authentication of existing Actual Ground Position Line. It fears Pakistan will occupy Siachen and it will be  asked to recapture the heights. Given the betrayals at Kargil, Mumbai and Pathankot, trust is the biggest casualty in India-Pakistan relations. Trust but verify any future settlement of Siachen, though India no longer considers it a low-hanging fruit. It has clubbed it with the overall resolution of Kashmir problem. If there is political will, a sound and stable framework for withdrawal backed by verifiable monitoring is achievable.

India should be flexible on Siachen; in time converting it from an arena of military contest to a snow park. The madness at Siachen in some ways is comparable to the competitive and awesome military theatrics at Wagah’s flag-hoisting and lowering ceremonies. Both are injurious to health. It will be a fitting tribute to the accidental people’s hero, Hanumanthappa and his nine unsung Sonam mates to fast track an agreement on withdrawal and de-militarisation to undo the joint folly of Siachen.

The author, a General officer, is founder-member of the Defence Planning Staff