Imran Khan’s flip-flop makes India wonder if he can be relied on

There was drama and flourish when Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan, the flamboyant cricketer-turned-politician, pledged to match every step India takes towards Pakistan with two. In terms of atmospherics, Khan’s invitation to SAARC leaders, including Prime Minister Narendra Modi, on August 11 looked to match the Indian Prime Minister’s gesture when he invited Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony. But in an abrupt about face, Khan decided against it, choosing instead to have his anointment ceremony ‘without any show of extravagance.’ 

Khan’s change of heart will make Delhi question his intentions. Of course, India understands that there was going to be no major breakthrough in relations, but the fact that Prime Minister Modi called Khan after his party’s victory, hoping that ‘Pakistan and India will work to open a new chapter in bilateral ties,’ suggested the possibility of a fresh start. One can even understand Khan not wanting to do so. After all, he has a domestic constituency to please and his talk about a Naya Pakistan which focuses on his clean image and ending corruption would undoubtedly come first. Delhi would have had no problem with that. What is disturbing is Khan’s uncertainty as it conveys the image of a man who is not sure and cannot be trusted to stick by his word. This can be dangerous from Delhi’s point of view. 

India may not be too bothered by this at the moment. The depredations in Uri, Pathankot, Pampore and the rising numbers of border incursions, despite PM Modi’s overtures — his landing in Lahore on the way from Afghanistan to greet Sharif on his birthday and attending the engagement ceremony of his granddaughter — suggests that Pakistan is unable or unwilling for normalcy with India. India too has been down the road to peace before, only to be betrayed with Kargil. But hope always springs eternal and possibly the best time to reach some kind of ‘normalisation’ is in the recent flush of Khan’s victory. It can come later, but this is certainly an opportunity missed by him.    

Imran had embraced politics in the late 1990s when Pakistan was in a mess, with the ISI cavorting with the US in its war against terror, alongside propping up both the Taliban and Osama bin Laden. It was in April 1996 when a bomb exploded in his hospital, in which half a dozen people died, that became a turning point for Khan. His subsequent formation of the PTI, buoyed by his righteous indignation over wholesale corruption and mismanagement, helped him to rally support from a young urban elite tired of the old political parties. Following this, he began to be seen as the favoured choice of the security establishment, attracting high-profile figures close to the Army and garnering sympathetic coverage from analysts and media known to back the military.

It is Imran’s close links with the military that Delhi is counting upon. That Pakistan’s military seeks to talk to India directly has been seen by reported feelers sent out by Pakistan military chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa to Delhi. It is possible then that talks with the military, through the civilian government of Imran Khan, may be a possibility in the future.

Having said this, for any kind of rapprochement to happen, India needs to have a deeper understanding of Khan’s political philosophy. So far, he has been a right-winger who has demanded ‘Islamic’ social justice — he prayed on stage at one of his political rallies to demonstrate his religiosity. Khan has also mobilised public support by tapping into a popular but simplistic theme that all of Pakistan’s ills could be blamed on a corrupt political elite, ‘bribed’ by the United States into cooperating in its war in Afghanistan. He campaigned against the US drone strikes and called for peace talks with the Pakistani Taliban. As a result, his critics have dubbed him the ‘Taliban Khan.’ Prompted by Khan, and eager to keep the peace in the heartland Punjab province, which was his main political fiefdom, Sharif had offered talks with the Pakistani Taliban in 2013. He had then wrongly assumed that the Pakistani Taliban could be contained if the tribal areas were left alone to run under Sharia law.

As a result, questions surround Imran Khan. How much can he deliver? Does he subscribe to the view of the Pakistani generals? If so, how much? Pakistan’s army have advocated a hard line against the Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) of Pakistan, but consider the Lashkar-e-Toiba as an asset? Does Khan too believe so? These questions aside, what will also concern India is Khan’s relationship with the US. Currently, the Trump administration is taking a hard line against Pakistan and future aid will be calibrated against Pakistan ending its support to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network. So far, Khan has propagated a hard anti-US stance. Will things change now that he has come to power? Will he veer away from Pakistan’s age-old dichotomy of ‘good terrorist-bad terrorist’? Such decisions will determine the power matrix of the sub-continent.

The author is a teacher and commentator on geopolitical affairs. Views are personal.