Obama comes calling

The just concluded Obama visit has elicited extensive comment and much of the focus has predictably been on the removal of the road-blocks that inhibited the implementation of the 2008 India-US civilian nuclear agreement. The political determination brought to bear by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to end this impasse is indeed commendable and US President Barack Obama, no doubt, complemented this resolve. The road ahead towards actual commercial engagement is still opaque and the fine print of the fiscal provisions of the Indian nuclear liability and the response of the potential US supplier remain uncertain as of now. 

However, the more strategically significant aspect of the Obama visit as opposed to the most visible strand (the Siri Fort address and the Bollywood reference) is perhaps the pithy one-page joint vision statement apropos the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.

Reiterating the common democratic ethos of the two countries and dwelling on the maritime expanse from ‘Africa to East Asia’, the operative paragraph reads: “Regional prosperity depends on security. We affirm the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea. We call on all parties to avoid the threat or use of force and pursue resolution of territorial and maritime disputes through all peaceful means, in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”

While India has been consistent in supporting resolution of potential conflicts in the East Asian region through peaceful dialogue and adherence to ‘recognised principles of international law’ — which in global diplomatic semantics is the equivalent of the motherhood and apple-pie template — the inclusion of the word “especially” in relation to the South China Sea (SCS) is to my mind very significant. 

PM Modi has made what may be termed as an assertive move on the regional strategic chessboard and this has clearly animated Beijing. The Chinese response has been a mix of disparaging the Obama visit and also cautioning India not to roil the SCS disputes which it is determined to address bilaterally with the affected ASEAN countries. 

For India, managing its uneasy relations with both the US and China remains an abiding challenge that goes back to 1962 and the many changes that have taken place in the last 50 years, including the blow-hot/blow-cold relations between the US and China since the Nixon-Mao rapprochement. India, while being a demographic and democratic heavyweight, is the relative subaltern in the emerging global comprehensive national power hierarchy. The US and China are in the top tier and within the next decade or even earlier an anomalous strategic exigency will unfold, wherein China will be the world’s leading GDP but the US will continue to be the most formidable military power and the declining status-quo global hegemon. 

The radical Bush-Manmohan Singh nuclear breakthrough of 2005-2008 laid the foundation for India to improve its relationship with the US from estrangement to engagement and as the recent bilateral trajectory indicates, this potential remained suspended in mid-air for six years. The Obama visit and  Modi's adroitness have enabled the removal of major hurdles and the current mantra is the ‘new chapter’ in India-US ties. 

While India is unlikely to become a US military ally like a Japan or an Australia, it is exploring the partnership option with Washington, though the contours of this remained elusive over the last decade. The reticence of the Congress-led UPA government was understandable, given its political leanings and the inclusion of the Indian Left spectrum in its first term. PM Modi appears to have arrived at a decision (personal or collective remains moot) to move in a definitive manner towards forging a closer relationship with the US and this was the sub-text of the Obama visit. 

However, India, which has the non-alignment orientation embedded in its strategic DNA, managed the US-USSR trapeze reasonably successfully. A quip in the Cold war decades used to be of the calf that could suckle two udders! The post Cold War world has transmuted into the uneasy post 9/11 global strategic environment where the primacy and efficacy of the Nation-state is being challenged both by the malignant non-State entity and the pervasiveness of 21st century globalisation. 

China, while being the rising power (when would it be deemed to have risen?), induces different degrees of discomfiture globally, but has its own share of grave internal anxieties. Preventing another Tiananmen and resolving the SCS disputes and those with Japan are of utmost primacy to the current leadership. To that extent, India and South Asia are of secondary importance, though Beijing’s deep links with Rawalpindi (HQ of the Pakistan army) provide the necessary strategic investment to stoke India's security concerns.

In this complex environment, both India and the US have an existential and transactional relevance for each other and despite their past history, which is dotted with mistrust and disappointments, there now appears to be a better understanding of the limits and possibilities of what could form the substance of the post Obama visit ‘new chapter'.

For India, the engagement with the US could enable it to enhance its technology and manufacturing profile which has cross-sectoral relevance in defence and military inventory, energy and the new technological domains such as space and cyber. Many of these Indian capabilities have been enabled by its close relationship with Moscow and the need to manage this relationship against the backdrop of a closer engagement with the US is yet another politico-strategic element of the Obama visit. 

The pointed reference in the joint vision statement to the maritime domain and the extended Asia-Pacific/ Indian Ocean region, which is also referred to as the Indo-Pacific continuum offers both opportunities and challenges to India. Intent has to be matched by domain capability which is currently modest in the Indian case. Seeding this eco-system, which includes ASEAN and the East Asian nations, in such a manner that serves to both encourage China to remain pacific even while assuaging its concerns will test the institutional perspicacity of the BJP-led NDA government. 

The February 1 visit to Beijing by Indian foreign minister Sushma Swaraj for trilateral talks that include Russia will be instructive to note how the Modi chess move is being perceived.

The author is Director, Society for Policy Studies, New Delhi