The crisis theory

A more divided nation both ethnically and denominationally, Turkey went to polls for a second time this year. In recent months, ambiguous election results and coalition negotiations had become critical in the light of heightened tensions over devastating extremist attacks and bombings in the capital, an increasingly violent struggle with minorities and waves of incoming refugees from the continuing conflict in Syria. The elections were portrayed as a solution not just for the political turmoil, but also for societal conflict and its effect on the economy. But, more importantly, the snap polls on November 1 was about whether the AKP (Justice and Development Party) would be able to restore itself as a single majority, preferably with 60 per cent of the seats. At the same time, there was also a strong message from the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) that the election was also about whether the Kurds would have free political will to determine their own future. Consequently, there were record turnouts and contrary to most opinion polls, the AKP won 361 seats and a clear majority with more than 49 per cent of the votes. The CHP (Republican People’s Party) was restricted to 134 seats while the pro-Kurdish HDP (Democratic People’s Party)and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), both of who crossed the 10 per cent threshold, secured 59 and 41 seats respectively. While the AKP has more than the 276 seats required to form a government, it is still 14 seats short of the majority required to call a referendum on its own to change the constitution. And this remains significant as President Recap Tayyip Erdogan had transformed the June 2015 ballot into a kind of referendum in his drive to rewrite the country’s constitution, abolish parliamentarianism and install a powerful new executive presidency occupied by himself.

Rewind to the earlier elections. On June 7, 2015, Turkey held general elections to elect 550 members of the Grand National Assembly and form the Twenty Fifth Parliament. The election campaign was marred by debates about the unlawful use of public funds by the ruling AKP, the state affiliated media’s biased representations of the parties and the President’s participation in the AKP’s election rallies, despite the Constitution requiring of him to remain impartial. The results were a reversal of 13 years of domination by the AKP as a single party government with the HDP managing to cross the 10 per cent barrier, reducing the number of seats that would have otherwise gone to the AKP. With the AKP failing to get the required seats to form a majority government, a coalition government had to be formed within 45 days in order to avoid fresh elections.  

However, the AKP strategy after the polls was to block the formation of a coalition government and undermine HDP’s future electoral prospects in the hope that the AKP would get a majority in the next polls, thereby averting the need for a coalition. Subsequently however, all attempts at forming a coalition government failed and snap elections had to be summoned. In the run up to the elections, there were attempts to muzzle HDP’s prospects and stoke nationalist sentiments to hurt the MHP. That the AKP was successful on both counts was evident from the decline in vote shares of both parties. There was also a renewal in anti-Kurdish policies, domestically as well as in the neighbourhood. Predictably, there were attacks on Turkish soldiers and police officers in the south east, with clashes between Kurdish militants and Turkish forces leaving casualties on both sides. The campaign of violence culminated in bombings on a procession in Ankara on October 10 that were subsequently blamed on the Islamic State which called for a resumption of the peace talks between PKK and the Turkish state. 

Recent attacks on the HDP and PKK have been validated under the rubric of ‘nation under threat’, to encourage voters into supporting President Erdogan’s ‘security first’ agenda. The justification for change was couched in terms of an effective executive State more capable of facing terrorism, civil war, economic decline and corruption. Under such circumstances, freedom of the press is often the first casualty, and in the week leading up to the polls there was increasing pressure to control non-government media. Prime Minister Ahmet Davutuglu, appealing to nationalist sentiments, drew attention to what he referred to as a “terror cocktail” of the PKK, the Islamic State and the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party Front, all of them wanting chaos in Turkey. The AKP election campaign for the November polls was based on the looming crisis, hinging on the “chaos, after us” slogan. 

The AKP victory has been hailed as “victory for democracy”, underlining that democracy and terrorism do not mesh well. While the results bring to an end the uncertainty of coalition politics with voters choosing stability over the polarisation of the past weeks, turbulent times may not yet be over. Consider the clashes that were witnessed in Kurdish Diyarbakir on the day of elections, and the failure on the part of four parties sharing seats in the Parliament, to work out a coalition arrangement. The political atmosphere prior to the elections has been identified as a major cause of the unexpected AKP victory alongside the miscalculations of its opponents and their failure to work out an alternative strategy. Predictably enough, President Erdogan in his first major speech, prioritised discussions among Parliamentarians to work out a completely new Constitution since the current one ‘full of details’, has ‘lost its relevance’. He argued that constitutional change was one of the underlining messages of the election.

The recent elections represent an important moment in Turkey’s political journey, and the result is a reflection of civil response to what was perceived as crisis of the State and their belief that stability rather than the uncertainty of coalition will be the solution to move out of this state of crisis. Crisis is defined as a time of decision and judgment, but it is also a turning point during which there will be change for better or for worse, or a return to the previous state of affairs. The current dynamics of ethnic violence, increased expectations and limited political space in Turkey is a combustible mix and it remains to be seen which way Turkish politics will be headed in the coming months.

The author is Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata