The myths of wild roses and Pakistani presence in Siachen
Indians are nice people. ‘It’s time to resolve Siachen’ says Pakistan army chief Parvez Kayani and immediately voices rise all over India to say, ‘Yes, it would be so nice to finally befriend Pakistan; are we not brothers?’
Indians are nice people. ‘It’s time to resolve Siachen’ says Pakistan army chief Parvez Kayani and immediately voices rise all over India to say, ‘Yes, it would be so nice to finally befriend Pakistan; are we not brothers?’
The good general called for demilitarisation of the Siachen glacier and advocated peaceful coexistence with India. He solemnly stated: ‘The world knows why we are in Siachen,’ inferring that Pakistan troops are positioned on the glacier. However, there is something wrong in the general’s reasoning, for the simple reason that Pakistan has never occupied the glacier, which lies east of the Saltoro Ridge, also in India’s possession. So why should India vacate a place belonging to her and in her possession? To give ideas to the Chinese that India should also vacate Tawang?
In 1984, a certain Brigadier Pervez Musharraf tried his luck. In a ‘Kargil’ style coup, he sent troops to take over the Siachen glacier. New Delhi was compelled to retaliate and occupy the treacherous Saltoro Ridge to stop Pakistan grabbing the gate to the Shyok valley and the entire Ladakh region. Since then, Pakistan has not set foot in the area.
There is a beautiful legend about the place. Once upon a time, a small Yarkandi village stood guarding the entrance to a mighty glacier of the Karakoram range. It was a meeting place for Balti traders to barter their goods with Central Asian merchants. One day, the Yarkandis decided to visit their southern neighbours; they descended from the glacier, but before returning north, they could not resist taking away a beautiful Balti girl. The offence could not remain unpunished.
The Baltis contacted a local cleric, who gave them an amulet to be placed on the summit of the Bilafond pass on the Saltoro ridge. The villagers were told to strictly follow the priest’s instructions and come back via Nubra valley. However, the Baltis performed only the first part of the ritual. After leaving the amulet on the pass, they did not use the Nubra track to return. Legend says that a terrible storm destroyed the Yarkandi village and only a few stones and wild roses remained.
Why did the roses not disappear? The priest’s instructions had been partially followed; result: wild roses could still grow in the area. This glacier is known as the Siachen (‘Sia’ is rose, ‘chen’ is place) ‘the place where roses bloom.’ But there are also political myths anchored to the 72 km long glacier: one such myth is that Pakistani troops are occupying the glacier. They are not and General Kayani’s ‘demilitarisation’ would be a unilateral business. Further, the Siachen issue was ‘solved’ long ago, in fact, in July 1949.
Following the ceasefire of January 1, 1949, the military representatives of India and Pakistan met in Karachi between July 18 and 27, 1949, under the auspices of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. An agreement was reached and the Line of Ceasefire (today’s LoC) was demarcated. The last point on the map was known as ‘NJ 9842.’ Nobody thought of going further north at that time. The agreement of July 1949, mentioned therefore that the Line extended ‘thence north to the glaciers’ without going into the details.
The important point that is forgotten was mentioned by Lieutenant General SK Sinha, a former Governor of J&K, who participated in the 1949 Karachi negotiations as the ADC to General Shrinagesh, the head of the Indian delegation. Before leaving for Pakistan, the delegates had a briefing from Nehru and the secretary general of the MEA, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, who explained the legal position to the delegates. He told them that the UN resolution of August 1948 ‘had conceded the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India and, as such, no man’s land, if any, should be controlled by India during the period of ceasefire and truce.’
This meant that the onus of proof to convince the commission of any factual position, on the date of ceasefire, in any disputed territory, rested with Pakistan. Sinha remembered: “In the absence of any such convincing proof, and even if India had no troops on the date of ceasefire in that area, the disputed territory should automatically come under Indian control… Based on this, we obtained control of several hundred square miles of State territory.’
This position was then accepted by Pakistan and the UN. It remains valid today. To accept Kalyani’ ‘offer’ would be to go against the only legal international document that proves the correctness of the Indian position in Kashmir.
All this to make a visit of the Indian prime minister to Pakistan successful? Indians can remain nice, but they should not be fools.
The author is a French-born journalist and writer