Turkey's uncertain future

The general elections of June 7, 2015, will be Turkey’s last elections till 2019. Coming at a time when Turkey and its neighbourhood are on the brink of profound transformations, the elections could well define the direction of West Asian politics for some time to come. This is not only because of the possibility of the pro-Kurdish HDP (Peoples’ Democratic Party) crossing the 10% threshold which would impact the distribution of seats in Parliament and redefine the future of the Kurdish issue in the region, but also the alternative possibility of the ruling AKP (Justice and Development Party) securing a large enough majority to change the Constitution. A clear perspective on either possibility is critical for developing India’s stance on the shifting dynamics of West Asian politics since Turkey has regained its significance as a mediator in the region. Also, given its long borders with Syria and India’s concerns about the developments in the Syrian civil war, the humanitarian crisis as well as the possibilities of this affecting the Indian community in the region and the transformations in Turkey assume salience. Syria and Iraq, the two countries where the Islamic State is the biggest threat, are on the ‘periphery’ of core Indian interests. An understanding of this new extremist Islam in Turkey’s neighbourhood as also a rereading of Islam within Turkey itself, are both crucial given the possibility of the extension of this radicalism in India’s neighbourhood. As such an understanding of ‘new’ Turkey and challenges in its neighbourhood will be critical in developing India’s West Asia policy. According to President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, much of this new or Yeni Turkiye will be defined in terms of a new Constitution which is why this general election is critical. 

The victory of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the August 2014 presidential elections had defined the beginning of a ‘new’ era in Turkey that would look towards transforming the parliamentary system into a presidential one. The success of Erdogan’s dreams would depend on the outcome of the general elections and AKP’s ability to push through constitutional changes. A significant part of the changes within Turkey has been reflected in the process of constitutional amendment which was given precedence by the AKP in its second term in power. It is in this context that the June 12, 2011, parliamentary elections assume importance. In the course of the campaign, both the AKP as well as the main opposition party the CHP (Republican People’s Party) committed themselves to introducing a democratic ‘civilian Constitution’ after the elections. Although on the surface there exists a broad consensus on the need to draft a new Constitution, contradictory opinions dominate   issues of contention that have plagued Turkish politics over the years — the Kurdish issue, the question of the place of religion and women in society and the role of the military. The AKP launched its election campaign with the slogan, “Vote for AK Party. Write your own Constitution” (Oyunu AK Partiye ver, kendi Anayasani yap!) a clear reference to the AKP agenda for a new Constitution to replace the one that came into force in 1982 during a period of military rule and which has been widely criticised for limiting individual rights. According to Article 175 of the Constitution, draft proposals to change the Constitution can only be accepted with three-fifths majority of the total number of seats in the Parliament.The AKP required 367 out of a total of 550 seats to approve a new Constitution on its own. The 49.9% vote that it received gave it 326 seats, requiring it to seek agreement from other parties.  Erdogan admitted that the election results indicated that the new Constitution should be created through agreement and negotiation and that the AKP would be respectful towards the rights of all sections of the state. As a part of this process of ‘democratic opening’, there was the beginning of a dialogue with the jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan that came to be known as the Imrali Process. 

Polls indicate that the HDP is on the borderline. While its exclusion could give the AKP 60 more seats, there are also reports of a critical upsurge for the HDP. In Western Anatolia a new Kurdish awakening has been triggered among Kurdish conservatives who used to vote for the AKP. Part of the reason is Erdogan’s political use of religion, including the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs). While the Kurdish Alevis traditionally vote for the CHP, the fact that the HDP has Kurdish Alevi candidates and because of its continuing leftist rhetoric the HDP may pull some votes that would otherwise be cast for the CHP. This would mean that the AKP would not be able to win even the minimum number of seats required to propose a constitutional change. In the 2014 local elections the AKP had 46% of votes, while the CHP had 28% and MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) 15%. If the HDP clears the 10% threshold while the AKP, CHP and MHP maintain their share of votes then the AKP will get approximately 286 seats. Though this would allow them to remain in power for another term (it takes 276 seats to form a government), it will fall short of the Erdogan’s requirement of a ‘supermajority’ of 400 seats and become a major roadblock for implementing the presidential form of government.

On the other hand, if the HDP fails to win seats it could trigger resentment and unrest in southeast Turkey and also urban areas in the west of the country. For the first time since 2002 there are also speculations about the possibility of a coalition government prompting President Erdogan to say that it would be a mistake to think that unspecified plotters can achieve on 7 June what they could not achieve in Gezi or what they failed to pull off in December 2013. The reference was to the Gezi Park protests of summer 2013 and the subsequent corruption probe that implicated people in his inner circle. Having insisted that democratic legitimacy stems from having half of the national vote, Erdogan and the AKP need to win a majority once again if he has to continue to use an electoral justification for his style of governance.

The author is Fellow, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Kolkata