Aadhaar fiasco: There can't be any compromise with privacy

Written By DNA Web Team | Updated: Oct 09, 2015, 09:45 AM IST

Those pitching for Aadhaar’s ability to streamline government functioning without taking heed of the Centre’s lax concern for privacy are myopic in their view

The central government has only itself to blame for failing in its attempt to extend the Aadhaar project to cover more welfare schemes. In defending the Aadhaar card project, the Centre told the Supreme Court that the right to privacy was not a fundamental right, rather than harping on the social benefits of the project through financial inclusion of the poor. This cavalier, if not contemptuous, attitude to privacy triggered alarm in both legal circles and civil society. Under the circumstances, the Supreme Court has acted wisely in referring the matter to a larger constitutional bench to iron out the State’s position on privacy. Nevertheless, the blow to the government is just temporary. In the long run, the court’s decision could ensure that Aadhaar lives up to its social potential without becoming a tool for surveillance and other unintended purposes.

In recent times, the imperatives of development, GDP growth, and governance have been thrown at those who raise worries about environment, communalism and freedoms. A similar attack has been launched on those who question the loose regulatory framework governing the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI). The proponents of Aadhaar highlight its potential to streamline the delivery mechanisms for social sector schemes by plugging leakages. In contrast, the Supreme Court’s interim order on Aadhaar usage restricts it to identifying beneficiaries of the public distribution system (PDS) and transferring subsidies on cooking gas and kerosene. The order came just as ambitious plans to use Aadhaar for biometric attendance, Jan Dhan Yojana, pension payments, scholarships, MGNREGA wage disbursals, and operating payment banks, were finalised. 

While the benefits of Aadhaar are not disputed, extending the unique identification system to all walks of life without parliamentary sanction and legislative cover is unacceptable and legally untenable. The government has concurrently embarked on aggressive Aadhaar enrolment drives and rolled out new services requiring Aadhaar cards while ingeniously claiming that Aadhaar enrolment is not mandatory. This puts immense pressure to enrol on even those who do not wish to submit their personal and biometric information to the UIDAI in the absence of privacy and statutory safeguards. Take for example, two other services where citizens have to mandatorily share information with the government — the Census and PAN Card. The Census Act mandates that all citizens cooperate with Census officials while Section 139A was inserted in the Income Tax Act to enable the I-T department to give statutory effect to its PAN card enrolment drive. 

The Aadhaar card is fast becoming the primary identity document for Indians and may even become an overriding part of our existence along with our names, age, and other aspects of our identity like sexual, regional, linguistic, caste and religious affiliations. That such a powerful authority is functioning in a legal vacuum speaks poorly for our democratic pretensions and parliamentary traditions. For a start, the UIDAI must be insulated from the government and private enterprises. Without delineating the UIDAI’s responsibilities in data management and storage, no legal recourse is available for actions that constitute data theft and unauthorised access. Citizens who have shared their private and biometric data must be safe in the knowledge that this would not be used to harm them, come what may. Recently, the government toyed with the idea of introducing a DNA Profiling Bill in Parliament. Perhaps, the government , forever cribbing about judicial intrusion in the policy domain, could go one-up over the judges and introduce a UIDAI Bill with strong privacy safeguards, before the larger bench of the Supreme Court concludes its hearings.