#dnaEdit: Hot pursuit option

Monday’s commando force attack on Naga rebel camps in Myanmar raises the question whether the onslaught may be counted as a prelude or a rehearsal to similar operations on the Pakistan front. At the same time, such a question can well be considered premature given that the situation on the eastern and western fronts are radically different from each other. The Indian and Myanmar governments have been in close consultation with regard to the handling of the insurgent groups in India. Despite the unpopularity of the generals ruling  from Yangon, successive Indian governments have maintained diplomatic relations with the junta. Monday’s attacks on the camps were carried out with the tacit consent of the Myanmar government. Unlike between New Delhi and Myanmar, there is no similar rapport between Delhi and Islamabad. 

It is then necessary to understand that the hot pursuit highlighted by Rajyavardhan Rathore, the minister of state for information and broadcasting, is not an easy option. Especially in the absence of government-to-government contact. In the case of the rebel camps in Myanmar, it is the case that Myanmar government does not have total control over the remote corner where the rebels have set up base for themselves. It is premature then for the Modi government and its supporters to proclaim loudly the achievement of the commando force that carried out the operation. It would have been better if the government had been discreet about the whole operation because it is a well-known principle that the best way to win the war against insurgents is to go about the job quietly until it gets over. 

It has for long been debated whether the best way of dealing with the Kashmiri insurgents was to attack the terror camps in Pakistan-Occupied-Kashmir (PoK) through a surgical operation. The problem lies with the Pakistan government. Islamabad pretends to be ignorant of the terror networks operating on its territory. Pakistan leaders and officials have even argued that Islamabad is not responsible for actions of non-State actors. It provides a good opportunity for India to accept the Pakistan argument on face value and attack the non-State actors over there.

The fact that India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states and that small acts of perceived provocation could lead to outbreak of full-scale hostilities between the two countries is the reason that the rest of the world sits up, as it did in 2002, when there was a stand-off between India and Pakistan, and then NDA government of Atal Bihari Vajpayee mobilised the army at the India-Pakistan border. 

India can think of hot pursuit on the Pakistan front only if the two governments were to agree that the terror groups need to be eliminated. It would also require close cooperation between the intelligence agencies on both sides as well as the commando forces of the two countries. This is a tall order at the best of times, and it is in the realm of an ideal solution. There is no realistic possibility of using the hot pursuit operation on the Pakistan front at the moment.

This should not, however, preclude the fact that India develop its capacity to carry out surgical operations in the neighbourhood against insurgents who threaten the Indian State. But this military capability cannot come into play without moving bilateral and multilateral political processes. Military force cannot be used in isolation. The understanding between the Indian and Myanmarese governments that facilitated the commando operation on the morning of June 9 will have to be replicated across south Asia. There is need for a multi-pronged approach to tackle insurgency and terrorism. It would be a folly to revel in short-term military solutions.