Nukes on the loose?

Pakistan military has checks in place for the arsenal but not enough for fissile materials

The suicide attacks by pro-Taliban elements that killed almost 35 people including many serving Pakistan military personnel on Saturday in Rawalpindi,  the heart of Pakistan  military’s GHQ has once again stoked fears about the safety of the country’s nuclear arsenal. It may be recalled that in recent weeks there has been wide-spread and not unfounded anxiety about the command and control of Pakistan’s nuclear assets and this was exacerbated to some extent by Musharraf’s interview to BBC (November 17) where he alluded to the fact that a disturbed political environment would not be conducive to the safety of the country’s strategic assets.

The Rawalpindi attack that also killed some ISI operatives, has led to  shrill commentary that this is indicative of the religious right having made inroads into the sanctum sanctorum of the Pakistan  military and that very soon the nuclear weapons will fall into jehadi hands.

This worst-case scenario that has also been referred to in an oblique manner in a recent book: Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Global Nuclear Weapons Conspiracy by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark. Hence  the US media has speculated that there  is a secret  arrangement   wherein the US has already acquired physical control of Pakistan’s nuclear assets — and in the event that there  is a jehadi melt-down, the US military has contingency plans to neutralise the threat.

This is very speculative and far-fetched and some objective stock-taking is in order. Preliminary analysis must follow from the facts on the ground — as they can be identified in this very opaque domain. These include inter alia: Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal  by end 2006 is estimated to be comprising 70 uranium bombs and 12 plutonium weapons;  these are held in a de-mated manner and the Pakistan military is the sole custodian of these assets with the Army Chief being at the top of the pyramid.

It may be noted that civilian Prime Ministers have remained outside the nuclear loop — and this is a distinctive feature of the Pakistan  nuclear arsenal — in that it is the only nation of seven declared nuclear weapon powers (USA, Russia, France, UK, China and India being others) where the military alone that has that symbolic finger on the button.  Also, Pakistan is the only country whose nuclear weapons are country specific — anti-Indian.
 
The second objective fact is that these assets of Pakistan are a very high value target for acquisition by the religious right — the jehadi non-state entities. However Musharraf and the Pakistan  militay’s high command is more than cognizant of this threat and have taken all the necessary precautions to ensure that such an exigency does not occur.

After the enormity of 9/11, the US has been in quiet consultation with Pakistan’s military establishment and it would be fair to infer that the location and safety of the nukes are known to the White House and that they are being monitored continuously. Personally I would not buy the theory that Pakistan has ceded control of its nuclear assets to the US and here the China factor is also relevant. It is extremely unlikely that Beijing — which would not be unaware of any such plan — would allow such an exigency.

It was this assurance of appropriate   Pakistan  military control over the nukes that may have been sought and obtained by US Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte when he visited Islamabad in mid-November. The US  has also provided US$ 100 million since 9/11 for improving the command and control of the Pakistan  nukes and this includes the PALS (permissible action links system) by which no single person can actually detonate a nuclear weapon.

Under these circumstances, it is extremely unlikely that a non-state entity would be able to storm any of the different nuclear weapon locations and spirit a nuclear core away. Hypothetically even if they did, actual use or detonation would be beyond their technical competence.

 What is a slim possibility is the loss of  fissile material to a non-state entity —which would call for massive collusion within Pakistan’s strategic assets division — and the threat of use of a dirty bomb, i.e, detonation through conventional explosives that has fissile material within it. This kind of a threat was held out by the Chechen rebels against Russia in the late 1990’s but swiftly and adequately neutralised.

It would be ideal if Pakistan’s nuclear weapons come under civilian control but given Islamabad’s messy reality the military currently remains the best custodian of the nukes. There is need to be very alert about this capability but Pavlovian  paranoia should be nuked!

The writer is a commentator on strategic affairs.