There is little doubt now that the most serious insurgencies in this country are not on its rim in the Northeast or for that matter in Kashmir but in its mainland. No less than home minister P Chidambaram has said that one in seven police stations in the country has seen incidences of Maoist extremism.

Yet, there is a contrast between the situation in the hinterland of forests and hills where Maoism today and Naxalism in the late 1960s made its stand and in the regions of the periphery. It is indeed true that a state like Manipur is going though protracted civil protest over atrocities by the security forces.

But it is doubtful if there has been a phase in the last four decades when the semblance of a political process has been at work so steadily in most though not all of frontier India. This emerges most clearly when one looks at the region with the oldest and deepest rooted of the separatist insurgencies: Nagaland.

The peace talks with the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) have now entered their 14th year. Though there has been no major breakthrough especially on the issue of a Nagalim that will include parts of several adjacent states, the fact is that neither the talks nor the ceasefire have broken down.

Even more significant and for the first time since the advent of the United Progressive Alliance government in the summer of 2004 is the statement of the Mirwaiz of Kashmir. Umar Farooq has asked his supporters not to be anti Indian and to be ready for dialogue.
As in the case of the veteran Naga leader T Muivah, nobody expects the Hurriyat leader to change his views or surrender his convictions. But the very readiness for dialogue is a positive step.

This passage from a situation of conflict and confrontation to dialogue and bridge-building is always difficult. More so when there are ethnic issues involved and there is a long record of deep alienation of the civil population from the government.

Yet, there is little sign of dialogue with the Maoists who are heirs to the Naxalite legacy that goes back over four decades. It is not just the rising of Naxalbari in north Bengal but also the agenda of the Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) founded in April 1969 by the late Charu Mazumdar that lies at its root.

Simply put, the idea was that Indian society and polity could only be transformed via an armed revolution. While this strand petered out by the mid and late 1970s, it never did die out and found fresh life over the last decade with the re-unification of several smaller splinter groups and the formation of a united Maoist party.

The contrast with a state like Jammu and Kashmir in this last decade could not be greater. The state now has two regionalist parties each with its own vision of autonomy, one led by the Abdullahs and the other by the Muftis.

Meanwhile in West Bengal, the birthplace of Maoism in India, the parliamentary Left parties are in crisis. At a meta level, such parties or the socialists never struck roots in the vast tribal hinterland that stretches across several states in Middle India. It is here that the last two decades have seen far-reaching economic and social changes, few of which have benefited in any serious way the bulk of the under class.

No one should have any illusions about the respect or human rights on either side. Many human rights groups have catalogued and the courts have also acknowledged the violation of basic rights by Salwa Judum in Chhattisgarh.

But it is equally important to recall that the recent beheading of a police officer by Maoists was no aberration. In fact a popular slogan o the Naxal movement in the early 1970s was to behead the class enemies.

But as in the case of Kashmir or Nagaland, there is no way a strategy simply based on force will succeed against Maoism. There is no doubt at all that ideologues committed to a path of armed struggle will not give up their beliefs and change their ways easily. But this is no reason to see their potential recruits and followers in the same light.

The previous UPA government brought about major pro-poor policy initiatives and legal enactments. In the Adivasi areas none was as significant as the Forest Rights Act that aimed to defuse discontent over land claims and tensions vis-a-vis the forest department. But the pace of implementation has been uneven.

Even worse, the measure, urgent as it was, went a very small way. If the inner frontier is to be peaceful and stable, its inhabitants need urgent public action to ensure they get a share of the fruits of development. The borderlands have shown an India willing to engage even as it refuses to bend.

Can similar statesmanship save the day on the inner frontier? The future is within grasp but only if the leadership reaches out for it.

The writer is a commentator on political affairs. Views expressed are personal.