The nuclear supermarket

A new book details how AQ Khan’s rogue nuclear network worked with impunity

The forthcoming book Deception: Pakistan, the United States and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons by Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott Clark will be a valuable addition to the public knowledge about the  permissiveness of the US Administrations on Pakistan’s proliferation activities throughout the nineties. The subject was recently dealt in BBC Correspondent Gordon Correra’s book Shopping for Bombs.

The CIA’s interest in AQ Khan goes back to 1975 when, according to the disclosures of Rudd Lubbers, former Dutch Prime Minister, it intervened with the Dutch intelligence to let Khan go free when they had arrested him. According to Lubbers the CIA intervened again with the Dutch authorities in 1986 when they detained him during a visit to Holland.

According to other reports, the CIA had been continuously watching AQ Khan rifle his baggage during his transit in Hong Kong from China in 1983 and came to know about Beijing supplying Pakistan its fourth bomb design. According to information furnished by General Arif in his book Working with Zia, during the negotiations on

Pakistan’s support to Mujahideen campaign against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, US Secretary of State Alexander Haig agreed that US would not interfere in Pakistan’s nuclear programme. In other words, US agreed to be permissive of China’s proliferation to Pakistan.

It is on record that in 1990 General Aslam Beg told visiting US Assistant  Secretaries of State that if US imposed sanctions on Pakistan then it would sell its nuclear technology to Iran.

George Tenet, the former Director of CIA in his book At the Center of the Storm obfuscates the issue admirably. He writes “For many years, there were rumors and bits of intelligence that Khan was sharing his deadly expertise beyond Pakistan’s borders. His range of international contacts was broad — in China, North Korea and throughout the Muslim world. It was extremely difficult to know exactly what he was upto or to what extent his efforts were conducted at the behest and with the support of the Pakistan government.

Khan was supposedly a simple government employee with only a modest salary. Yet he lived a lavish life style and had an empire that kept expanding dramatically. Although CIA struggled to penetrate proliferation operations and learn about the depth of their dealings. There is a tension when investigating these kinds of networks. The natural instinct when you find some shred of intelligence about nuclear proliferation is to act immediately. But you must control that urge and be patient to follow the links where they take you, so that when action is launched you can hope to remove the network.”

This very cleverly worded passage covers the fact that CIA knew about Khan’s activities for years. While it raises the question whether Pakistan’s government knew about Khan’s activities it does not pose the real question, whether the Pakistan’s Army Chief and the ISI knew about Khan’s activities. Unofficial reports in Pakistan say that Khan’s proliferation had the approval of every Army Chief from Aslam Beg onwards.

The US policy towards nuclear proliferation, derived from these accounts appears to be as follows. China’s proliferation to Pakistan and Khan’s role in it were accepted as the price to get Pakistan’s support for Afghan Mujahideen campaign against Soviet forces. Thereafter AQ Khan’s proliferation activity was allowed to go on in the hope it will lead to uncovering the proliferation network. Many American observers say that the Khan network has not been  eliminated root and branch and the roots have again sprouted giving fresh life to the network.

Quite a few of the Nonproliferation Ayatollahs who have expressed vigorous opposition to Bush Administration exceptionalising India for civil nuclear  cooperation come from the Clinton Administration and must have been privy to AQ Khan’s proliferation activities. Bush perhaps had this long history of proliferation in mind when he told Musharraf that Pakistan ‘s history was different from India’s and therefore it could not  be treated the same way.

The moral of this tale is the US policy on nuclear proliferation is not governed always by its laws but very often by political exigencies. US proliferation policy was not only determined by its need for Pakistan’s support for Mujahideen campaign but also its desire not to upset the Pakistan General to maintain good relations with China.

The writer is is strategic affairs analyst.