DNA Exclusive | Need to enforce ceasefire & reduce violence in Kashmir: General Ehsan ul Haq

General Ehsan ul Haq retired as Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee of the Pakistan Military in October 2007. He was chief of much-lambasted Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the premier Pakistan intelligence agency, between October 2001 and 2004, the crucial period that saw American intervention in Afghanistan. He is also one of the key persons to have negotiated the ceasefire enforced in 2003 along the Line of Control (LoC) with his Indian counterparts, which later went for a toss. 


Speaking with DNA's Iftikhar Gilani in Dubai recently, ul Haq elucidated on some key issues.


DNA: You were the Director-General of the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) when the attack on the Indian Parliament took place. Author Adrian Levy in his recent book – The Exile, has found a link between the attack and US operations to flush out Osama bin Laden from Afghanistan's Tora Bora mountains. The US had paid the Pakistan army to assist by plugging Tora Bora's back door – a plan devised by Bob Grenier, the CIA station chief in Islamabad. However, as soon as the attack on the Indian Parliament took place, you took your troops away and let Laden disappear.

Gen ul Haq: If you can recall the incident, the attack on the Indian Parliament happened in December 2001, while I joined ISI in October. I came when the Kabul bombing had already begun. Our focus was Afghanistan. At no stage has Bob Grenier ever accused Pakistan of not supporting the US wholeheartedly, even though they did not share their game plan with us. 

They had not told us what they were doing in Tora Bora and when we didn’t know what was happening, then how they could have expected us to capture bin Laden. Also, at the very same moment, the Indian Army cordoned off our borders in the east. We had made it clear that unless our eastern borders are secure, we will not be able to provide requisite support at our western borders.

We wanted to contain any and all cross-border incidents because President (Parvez) Musharraf and I wanted to de-escalate the situation along the eastern border and normalise relations with India to focus on the emerging crisis in Afghanistan. It was during that time that the Indian Parliament attack happened. In my view, attacks like these don’t happen so spontaneously. They need much planning. 

I am sure the planning for this started much before 9/11 happened. Therefore, I don’t think there is any linkage between the Tora Bora operations, the attack on the Indian Parliament or any other incidents along the eastern border. 


Q: When you were at the helm, contours of an interim solution for Jammu and Kashmir issue were coming up. How you look back on this?


A: Right now, we need to prioritise enforcing ceasefire along the LoC and reduce violence inside Kashmir. If there is continuous violence inside Kashmir, we will be unable to avail the opportunity to move towards long-term peace. We have to revive, expand and reinforce confidence-building measures (CBMs) that came about in the last 10-15 years or so. Once allowed, these CBMs will create an environment to reach a mid-term/long term solution. There are many such formulas, including the Musharraf-Vajpayee-Manmohan Singh one.

There are elements of this formula that are relevant and there are other formulas as well. Now, we need to put these together and evolve a lasting formula. But the basic need is to identify stake holders. You must make sure that everyone is heard. In the Musharraf-Vajpayee-Manmohan formula, Kashmiris struggled to be part of the process. To avoid recurrence of this outcome, there must be a dialogue between Delhi and Srinagar and Kashmir, Pakistan and India, and also an intra-Jammu and Kashmir dialogue. 

Q: But General Sahab, when infiltrations continue to occur and the trade of arms keep the Kashmir cauldron boiling, how do we see peace to take root? It is a known fact that violence begets violence.

A: That is the Indian viewpoint, but is not the situation. The kind of cross-border infiltrations that took place in the 90s and early 2000s don't occur anymore. Your argument may be used by India as a pretext to push aggressive policies, but it is not an excuse anymore. The reality is that the situation along the LoC can be controlled.

Q: China has emerged as another irritant for India and a challenge to its security. C-PEC is particularly seen as a security threat in India.

A: As far as China is concerned, we share excellent relations, both historically and traditionally. They support our national defence. Since it is a global power now, something that did not just happen overnight, it is but natural that its influence will spread next door.

India said C-PEC violates its territorial integrity. It is, in fact, drawing unnecessary attention. One may say that Karakorum highway also goes into the same region and has been there for over the past 40 years doing all that C-PEC has been doing.

Q: Not only with India, your relations with other neighbours have dipped as well. There are serious issues with Iran as well as Afghanistan.

A: We share excellent border cooperation with Iran. Yes, there are problems with Afghanistan, but it is not related to recent events. In good times, i.e. before 1979, there was a strained relationship with Afghanistan. Even our embassy in Kabul was ransacked twice. We understand the internal dynamics of Afghanistan and are trying our best to regulate this border. A trench spanning several hundred kilometres along the border in Balochistan is nearing final construction. We are currently fencing this border.

Q: Pakistan has allegedly been putting roadblocks in the development of Chahbahar port in Iran fearing it will be a competition to Gwadar.

A: Iranians have told us clearly that there is no case of competition between the two ports. They would actually like Chahbahar to be the sister port that integrates the two. We don’t view Iranians as adversaries. We don’t see Chahbahar as any threat. But we do keep watch on Indian activities there.


Q: As part of President Musharaf’s team, you were instrumental in enforcing the ceasefire along the LoC in 2003. How did that happen? There are reports that you had met then RAW chief CD Sahay to discuss this

A: I don’t and can't comment on my activities when I was in office, but I had many meetings with interlocutors. But I can't comment on a specific meeting. But I do confirm that many back channels evolved discussing the broader ambit of India-Pakistan relations and how to de-escalate tensions. These back channels ultimately converged into an agreement which led to the unilateral announcement of ceasefire by Pakistan, which India responded to. There was a lot of homework. In fact, Pakistan did make the announcement unilaterally, but India was part of it.

At that time, there was also consensus that too many civilian casualties were taking place because of rising tension at the LoC. It is happening today as well. There is need to revisit the ceasefire agreement of 2003 again.


Q: But questions are being raised at that (ceasefire) agreement; that it didn’t evolve through a political agreement and had no mechanism to monitor it, eventually leading to its failure.

A: I agree. In fact, a peace process had begun immediately after the ceasefire and it was believed that it would lead to permeant de-escalation. However, we have been insisting that a mechanism is put in place since then. Pakistan believes that there is a system of the United Nations Military Observer Group which is assigned to monitor violations. But, India doesn’t want to involve a third party. In my view, even today there is need to establish who actually violates the LoC. We still have the UN option available. 

Nonetheless, we are prepared to discuss any arrangement to monitor and establish who actually violates the LoC agreement. Strick observance of the ceasefire is fundamental to rest of developments. When the ceasefire is continuously violated, you cannot expect the bus services to run peacefully. We cannot expect trade volume to remain normal or grow. It is causing serious impact in perception and reality as well.


Q: Several US government leaders and members of Congress and Senate have said that Pakistan was playing a double game in Afghanistan. There is this perception that you don’t allow a proper democratic government in Kabul to work in an atmosphere that is free from violence and terror.

A: First of all, it is very unfortunate to hear that we are playing a double game. You see, Pakistan certainly has very good relations with the United States. We have made enormous sacrifices in support of their war on terror. But to expect that Pakistan will act against its own interests to extend US agenda is an unfair expectation. There are always disagreements on strategies and operationalizing them even among the best of friends, but to call these things a double game is most unfair in any relationship.

The fact is that the US and its strategies in Afghanistan have failed and that they have not been able to achieve the success they were hoping with the application of military power and enormous investment in terms of resources. We have supported peace and stability in Afghanistan. We have supported Afghan governments and Afghan-led and Afghan-based peace processes. Now, when Taliban and the Afghan government are not ready to talk to each other and when Americans have failed to develop a dialogue process, how can they blame us?

Q: As an expert on Afghanistan, since you have held an important position in the Pakistani Army along those borders, what in your view is the endgame in Afghanistan?

A: In my view, this has to be decided by the Afghan government, the opposition, and the American. The Americans themselves say they are not there to stay permanently. There is no military solution. They have been saying that they want a political solution. While their strategies may be correct, they are failing in terms of operationalizing these policies. After all, Talibanis are also Afghans. They are not al-Qaeda. They cannot be denied a role in the future of Afghanistan. But one doesn’t expect them to play the role of a militant.


Q: Also, there is a question in India, Who do we talk to in Pakistan? Who is actually in charge?

A: The Prime Minister of Pakistan of course. This is a narrative to undermine the legitimacy of our democracy and malign our armed forces.

Q: How can Pakistan expect better relations with India when it is not in support of the judicial closure on the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks and has also added a recent irritant by way of try Indian citizen Kulbhushan Jadhav?

A: As far as 26/11 is concerned, Pakistan is fully supportive in finding the real culprits and identifying the real details. Unfortunately, the sense in Islamabad is that Indians are prolonging by not cooperating. And let me remind you of the Samjhuta Express bombing that pre-dates 26/11. We are still nowhere and still don’t hear anything.

As far as Kulbhusan is concerned, it has to be seen in the context of India’s public pronouncement that it would like to support separatists in Balochistan. Everybody knows they were openly being hosted and entertained in New Delhi over the past year. When you put two and two together, you can make out what India's game plan is. Pakistan will have to build a defensive mechanism to counter this.


Q: ISI is considered a dreaded organisation and you have been chief of this organization.

A: (smiles) All intelligence organisation are feared. In India, ISI is seen as a troubling organization, but intelligence agencies all over the world, whether it is CIA, MI6, your RAW and IB, are all same. They are part of the national security apparatus.