US playing own game in sharing intel with India

Is a grand American intelligence game unfurling in India? Is there a motive behind US agencies’ regular alerts and inputs on terrorist activities? Is a larger, murkier conspiracy at play?

India’s intelligence and security establishment is searching for answers as it looks deep into the concerted US assistance over the past few years, especially after the Mumbai attacks of November 2008. The worrylines have become deeper in the wake of the arrest of the mysterious David Coleman Headley who, reports and sources suggest, could well be an American agent who turned rogue. 

Dependable sources told DNA that almost 80% of the intelligence alerts and leads on Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and other ‘foreign’ terror groups after the 26/11 attacks last year had originally come from the US. The alerts have mostly turned out be false or unsubstantiated. The latest was last week’s warning about Pashtun-looking suicide bombers trained by the Taliban, planning to attack Delhi, Kolkata and Mumbai.

In the post-26/11 days, instead of improving its intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities, India let the US ‘intelligence pipeline’ gather prominence and tighten its grip on the country’s terror intelligence, officials now admit. Most of them regret it. 

The US agencies, both the FBI and CIA, have been regularly giving Indian agencies warnings about imminent terrorist attacks. These alerts have been used by the security establishment to issue warnings to the state polices and other agencies. These have also significantly contributed to public hysteria, and deployment of hundreds of security personnel.

Sources say that the motive behind American warnings has come under greater scrutiny after Indian intelligence agencies became convinced that Headley was an American mole who managed to penetrate the LeT network. The warning that the US gave India in September 2008, just two months before the Mumbai attacks -- about the terrorists planning to target Mumbai landmarks and their reconnaissance of the targets -- may well have come from Headley, the officers now believe.

However, suspicion of the US agencies did not start with the Headley case. Many who handled the investigations into the curious case of Ken Haywood — the US citizen whose internet connection was allegedly used by Indian Mujahideen operatives to send out an email warning of the Ahmedabad serial blasts in July 2008 — have had doubts since then.   

While he was still under investigation by the anti-terror squad in Mumbai, Haywood managed to slip out of India despite a lookout notice against him in all Indian airports.

Sources say that the American agencies are providing “some or the other” intelligence input almost every alternative week. Officials also suspect a strategy behind the “random distribution of information” by the US agencies into the Indian system. They provide it to either IB and RAW in Delhi, or to Indian operatives outside India.

Just two weeks before the first anniversary of 26/11, India’s DIA was told by US military officials that some al Qaeda terrorists were planning attacks in India. It was surprising that such sensitive information should be passed on to the DIA, because otherwise the US cooperation on terror front is with the R&AW and IB.

In August, the US agencies issued a warning about a North Korean vessel MV Mu San, saying it was carrying suspected material for nuclear weapons or other suspect cargo. The ship was forced to berth at Kakinada, and a massive security operation was carried out. Worse, the entire cargo of the ship was offloaded and a team of nuclear scientists flown in from Mumbai to inspect the cargo. Nothing suspicious emerged.

In November, yet again, the American agencies alerted India about a suspicious ship of Malta registration, carrying radioactive material. The ship was detained in Chennai, but this time instructions were sent out not to offload the cargo.

More than one source told DNA that none of the Indian intelligence agencies have a consistent and independent watch on LeT. In effect, the Indian perceptions and public posturing on the militant group is mostly “shaped by the American inputs,” says a senior official. Such dependence “is a dangerous game,” says a former chief of an intelligence agency.

As the Americans started feeding the Indian system on a regular basis, the post-26/11 terror watch of India came to be heavily dependent on the US inputs, sources now admit. And instead of improving themselves, Indian intelligence agencies increasingly leaned on the US inputs. The only visible improvement was the system of collating terror alerts at IB’s MAC (multi agency centre), but most of the alerts they send out are flowing from the US.